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1.   Man, the cooperative great ape 
 
 It has become commonplace to observe that, among the five species of great ape,  
homo sapiens is by far the most cooperative.   Fascinating experiments with infant 
humans and chimpanzees, conducted by Michael Tomasello and others, give credence to 
the claim that a cooperative protocol is wired into to the human brain, and not to the 
chimpanzee brain.    Tomasello’s work, summarized in two recent books with similar 
titles  (2014, 2016),  grounds the explanation of humans’ ability to cooperate with each 
other in their capacity to engage in joint intentionality,  which is based upon a common 
knowledge of purpose, and trust. 
 There are fascinating evolutionary indications of early cooperative behavior 
among humans.   I mention two:  pointing and miming, and the sclera of the eye.  
Pointing and miming are pre-linguistic forms of communicating, probably having 
evolved due to their usefulness in cooperative pursuit of prey.  If you and I were only 
competitors, I would have no interest in indicating the appearance of an animal that we, 
together, could catch and share.    Similarly, the sclera  (whites of the eyes) allow you to 
see what I am gazing it:  if we cooperate in hunting, it helps me that you can see the 
animal I have spotted, for then we can trap it together and share it.   Other great apes do 
not point and mime, nor do they possess sclera. 
 Biologists have also argued that language would likely not have evolved in a non-
cooperative species (Dunbar[2009] ).  If we were simply competitive, why should you 
believe what I would tell you?  Language, if it began to appear in a non-cooperative 
species, would die out for lack of utility.  The problem of cheap talk would be severe.    
In addition, language is useful for coordinating complex activities – that is, ones that 
require cooperation.   It would not have been worth Nature’s investment in a linguistic 
organ, were the species not already capable of cooperation, so the argument goes. 
 Cooperation must be distinguished from altruism.   Altruism comes in three 
varieties:  biological, instrumental, and psychological.  Biological altruism is a hard-
wired tendency to sacrifice for others of one’s species, which sometimes evolved through 
standard natural selection, as with bees and termites.     Some people speak of 
instrumental altruism, which is acting to improve the welfare of another, in expectation of 
a reciprocation at some time in the future.    It is questionable whether this should be 
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called altruism at all, rather than non-myopic self-interest.   Psychological altruism is 
caring about the welfare of others: it is a kind of preference.   It is intentional, but not 
motivated by self-interest, as instrumental altruism is.    Psychological altruism is what 
economists usually mean by the term. 
 Cooperation is not the same as psychological altruism.  I may cooperate with you 
in building a house because doing so is the only way I can provide myself with decent 
shelter.    It is of no particular importance to me that the house will also shelter you.  
Cooperation is, I believe, a more generalized tendency in humans than altruism.  One 
typically feels altruism towards kin and close friends, but is willing to cooperate with a 
much wider circle.    With the goal of improving human society, I think it is much safer 
to exploit our cooperative tendencies more fully, than our altruistic ones. 
 The examples I gave above of cooperation are quite primitive.   Humans have, of 
course, engaged in much more protracted and complex examples of cooperation than 
hunting.   We live in large cities, cheek by jowl, with a trivial amount of violence.   We 
live in large states, encompassing millions or hundreds of millions, in peace.    Early 
human society (in its hunter-gatherer phase) was characterized by peace in small groups, 
up to perhaps several hundred, but by war between groups.  Our great achievement has 
been to extend the ambit of peaceful coexistence and cooperation to groups of hundreds 
of millions, groups between which war continues to exist.    In this sense, cooperation has 
expanded immeasurably since early days. 
 Within large states, of an advanced nature, a large fraction of the economic 
product is pooled, via taxation, and re-allocated according to democratic decisions.  We 
have huge firms, in which cooperation is largely decentralized.     Trade unions show the 
extent of cooperation in firms that is decentralized and tacit when, in labor struggles, they 
instruct their members to ‘work to rule.’    In other words, it is wrong to view cooperation 
as primarily organized centrally; it’s a false dichotomy to say that competition is 
decentralized and cooperation must be centrally planned.   By far most instances of 
human cooperation are decentralized as well. 
 From this perspective, it is quite astonishing that economic theory has hardly 
anything to say about cooperation.   Our two greatest contributions to understanding 
economic activity – the theory of competitive equilibrium, and game theory with its 
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concomitant concept of Nash equilibrium --  are theories of how agents compete with 
each other.     Behavior of agents in these theories is autarchic:  I decide upon the best 
strategy for me under the assumption that others are inert.   Indeed, in Walrasian general 
equilibrium, a person need not even observe the actions that others are taking: she need 
only observe prices, and optimize as an individual, taking prices as given.   Nothing like 
Tomasello’s joint intentionality exists in these theories: rather, other individuals are 
treated as parameters in an agent’s optimization problem. 
 It would, however, be a mistake to say that economic theory has ignored 
cooperation.   Informally, lip service is paid to the cooperative tendency of economic 
actors:  it is commonplace to observe that contracts would not function in a cut-throat 
competitive society.   There must be trust and convention to grease the wheels of 
competition.   Nevertheless, this recognition is almost always in the form of the gloss 
economists put on their models, not in the guts of the models.   
 There is, however, one standard theory of cooperation, where cooperative 
behavior is enforced as the Nash equilibrium of a game with many stages.  There are 
typically many Nash equilibria in such games.  The ‘cooperative’ one is often identified 
as a Pareto efficient equilibrium, where the cooperative behavior is enforced by 
punishing players at stage t+1 who failed to play cooperatively at stage t.    Since 
punishing others is costly to the punisher, those assigned to carry out punishment of 
deviants must themselves be threatened with punishment at stage  , should they fail 
to punish.   Only if such games have an infinite or indefinite number of stages can this 
behavior constitute a Nash equilibrium.  For if it were known that the game had only 
three stages, then no person in stage 3 will punish deviators from stage 2, because there is 
no stage 4 in which they would punished for shirking.  So in stage 2, agents will fail to 
play cooperatively.  By backward induction, the ‘good’ equilibrium unravels.  (See 
Kandori [1992]. ) 
 What’s interesting about this explanation of cooperation is that it forces 
cooperation into the template of non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.  I will maintain that 
this is an unappealing solution, and too complex as well.  It is a Ptolemaic attempt to use 
non-cooperative theory to explain something fundamentally different. 
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 Let me give a simple example,  the prisoners’ dilemma, with two players and two 
strategies,  C(ooperate) and D(efect).    In fact,  the strategy profile (D,D) is something 
stronger than a Nash equilibrium: it’s a dominant strategy equilibrium.    If the game is 
played with an indefinite number of stages, then the behavior where both players 
cooperate at each stage can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium, if punishments are 
applied to defectors.    I propose, alternatively, that in a symmetric game like this one, 
each player may ask himself   “What’s the strategy I’d like both of us to play?”  This 
player is not considering the welfare of the other player: she is asking whether for her 
own welfare a strategy profile (C,C) is better than the profile (D,D).  The answer is yes, 
and if both players behave according to this Kantian protocol  (‘take the action I’d like 
everyone to take’), then the Pareto efficient solution is achieved in the one-shot game. 
 What is needed for people to think like this?  I believe it is being in a solidaristic 
situation.  Solidarity is defined as ‘a union of purpose, interests, or sympathies among the 
members of a group (American Heritage Dictionary).’    Solidarity, so defined,  is not the 
action we take together, or the feeling I have towards others, it is a state of the world  that 
might induce unison action.   Solidarity may promote joint action, in the presence of 
trust: if I take the action that I’d like all of us to take, I can trust others will take it as well.  
To be precise, as we will see, this behavior has good consequences when the game is 
symmetric  (to be defined below).  Symmetry is the mathematical form of ‘a union of 
purpose or interests.’    Thus Tomasello’s joint intentionality, for me, is what comes 
about when there is a union of a solidaristic state and trust.     
 Trust, however, must be built up from past experience.  I therefore do not claim 
that it is rational in a truly one-shot game to ask the Kantian question.  Nash equilibrium 
is the rational solution of the truly one-shot game.  But in real life, we are very often in 
situations where trust is warranted, either because of past personal experience with 
potential partners, or because of social conventions, of culture.  In these situations, trust 
exists, and the Kantian question is a natural one to ask.   
 Now you might respond that, if the game is really embedded in a multi-stage 
game of life, then the reason that I take the action I’d like all of us to take is for fear that 
if, instead, I played ‘Defect’ (say,  in the prisoners’ dilemma)  I will be punished in the 
future, or I will fail to find partners to play with me.    Indeed, I think some people do 
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think this way.  But many people, I propose, do not.  They have embedded the morality 
that playing the action I’d like all to play is ‘the right thing to do’ and a person should do 
the right thing.    This behavior is not motivated by fear of punishment, but by morality.   
The morality, however, is not appropriately modeled as an object of preferences, but by a 
manner of optimizing.   This may seem like a pedantic distinction, but I will argue that it 
is not. 
 Indeed, we now come to the second way that contemporary economics explains 
cooperation, and that is under the rubric of behavioral economics.   Behavioral 
economics has many facets: here I am only concerned with its approach to explaining 
cooperation.  I claim that the general strategy adopted by behavioral economists to 
explain cooperation is to insert exotic arguments into preferences – like a sense of 
fairness, a desire for equality, a care for the welfare of others, experiencing a warm glow 
– and then to derive the ‘cooperative’ solution as a Nash equilibrium of this new game.   
Thus, for example, a player in the prisoners’ dilemma plays C because it would be unfair 
to take advantage of an opponent playing C by playing D.   In this formulation both (C,C) 
and (D,D) would be Nash equilibria, if I incur a psychic cost for playing D against your 
C.    Or suppose we simply say that the player gets a ‘warm glow’ from playing C  (see 
Andreoni [1990]).  Then the unique Nash equilibrium, if the warm glow is sufficiently 
large, will be (C,C).  
 Indeed, Andreoni’s ‘warm glow’ merits further comment.  I think it’s true that 
many people get a warm glow from playing the Kantian action, from doing the right 
thing.  But the warm glow is an unintended side effect, to use Elster’s (1981) 
terminology, not the motivation for the action.   I teach my daughter the quadratic 
formula.  She gets it: I enjoy a warm glow.  But I did not teach her the formula in order 
to generate the warm glow, which came along as a result that I did not intend.   Andreoni 
has reversed cause and effect.   The same criticism applies to explanations of charity.   
The Kantian explanation is that I give what I’d like everyone in my situation to give, 
rather than my giving because it makes me feel good – which is not to deny that I do feel 
good when I do the right thing. 
 The Kandori explanation of cooperation as a Nash equilibrium in a multi-stage 
game with punishments is what Elster (1989) calls a social norm.   To be precise, it is 
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part of Elster’s characterization of social norms that those who deviate be punished by 
others, and those who fail to punish deviators are themselves punished by others.  
Doubtless, many examples of cooperation are social norms: but not all are.    It has often 
been observed by economists that normal preferences for risk will not explain the extent 
of tax compliance, given the probabilities of being caught for evading, and the 
subsequent (small) fines.  In some countries, tax evaders’ names are published in the 
newspaper, and there it may well be that compliance is a social norm.     In many cities, 
large numbers of people recycle their trash.   Often, nobody observes whether or not one 
recycles.  There is no punishment, in these cases, for failing to recycle: but many recycle 
nevertheless.  Assuming that recycling is somewhat costly, the Nash equilibrium – even 
if people value a clean environment – is not to recycle.  (I should not recycle if the cost of 
recycling to me is greater than the marginal contribution my recycling makes to a clean 
environment.) Recycling, I think, is better explained as a Kantian equilibrium.    Not 
everyone recycles because not everyone thinks Kantian.   
 People’s trust in others may come with thresholds.   I will recycle if I see or read 
that fraction q of my community recycles.   There is a distribution function of the 
thresholds q in the community.   In figure 1 such a distribution function is graphed;   
there is a stable equilibrium where fraction   recycle.  (There are also unstable 
equilibria where fraction 0 or fraction 1 recycle.)  I have called these people conditional 
Kantians;   Elster (2017)  calls them quasi-moral  (if  and reserves the label 
‘Kantian’ for those for whom  .   Nash players have :  they always play Nash, 
no matter how many others are playing Kantian.   
 
[place figure 1 here] 
 
 There are, I think, three explanations of how workers cooperate when they go on 
strike, or why people join revolutionary movements or dangerous demonstrations and 
protests against the government.  The first, promulgated by Olson (1965), is of the 
repeated-game-with-punishments variety.  Workers who cross the picket line are beaten 
up.   Or, there is a carrot:  joining the union comes with side payments.  Olson’s 
explanation is clearly cooperation-as-a-Nash-equilibrium-with-punishments.   Recently,  
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Barbera and Jackson (2017) explain these actions as occurring because participants enjoy 
an expressive value from the action:  they value expressing their opposition to the regime 
or the boss.   This is what I’ve called the behavioral-economics approach:  putting exotic 
arguments into preferences.    I (in press)  model strikes as games where players’ 
strategies are their probabilities of striking:  in the case where all preferences are the 
same, the Kantian equilibrium is a probability that will maximize my expected income if 
everyone strikes with that probability.  (With heterogeneous preferences, the story is 
more complicated.)  Preferences are straight-forward economic preferences, with no 
expressive element; nor are there punishments.  It is not unusual in this model for the 
Kantian equilibrium to be that each strikes with probability one.    In reality, we do not 
often observe this, because not everyone is a Kantian.    There may well be punishments, 
in reality, to deter those who would not strike when the strike is on.   But it is wrong to 
infer that those punishments are the reason that most people strike.  The punishments may 
be needed only to control a fairly small number of Nash optimizers.    And if the workers 
are conditional Kantians, or q-Kantians, it is possible for a strike to unravel if even a 
small number of Nash players are not deterred from crossing the picket line1.   
 I have thus far only discussed symmetric games – true solidaristic situations, 
.where all payoff functions are the same, up to a permutation of the strategies.  I will now 
formalize what I have proposed, before going on to the more complicated problem of 
games that are not symmetric, where payoff functions are heterogeneous. 
 
12.  Simple Kantian equilibrium 
 Consider a game where all players choose strategies from an interval I of real 
numbers, and the payoff function of player i is  
    (2.1) 
where the vector of strategies is denoted   and   is the vector E without 
its ith component.     
Definition 2.1   A simple Kantian equilibrium is a vector   such that: 
                                                 
1 Unravelling will not occur at the   equilibrium in Figure 1, which is a stable 
equilibrium.  But it will occur if the equilibrium is at  . 
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   . (2.2) 
That is,  among all vectors where everyone plays the same strategy2, the strategy that 
everyone would choose is .    This is the formalization of the statement that each plays 
the strategy he’d like everyone to play.  
   
Definition 2.2   A game is strictly monotone increasing if each player’s payoff is strictly 
monotone increasing in the strategies of the other players.  It is strictly monotone 
decreasing if it is strictly monotone decreasing in the strategies of the other players. 
 The standard example of a strictly monotone increasing game is when a person’s 
E is contribution to a public good.  The more others contribute, the higher my welfare.  
The standard example of monotone decreasing game is the common-pool resource 
problem.   We all fish on a common lake, and the more others fish, the less productive is 
the lake for me. 
 A symmetric game is one where all agents have the same payoff function, subject 
to a permutation of the strategy profile.   For my purposes, we may consider symmetric 
games where each player’s payoff is a function of her strategy and the sum of all 
strategies, that is: 
    
 for all i,  , some  , (2.3) 
where  .   It is immediate to observe that if a game is symmetric, in the sense 
of satisfying (2.3), then a simple Kantian equiliabrium exists3. 
 
 The Nash equilibria of strictly monotone games are Pareto inefficient.  The failure 
of efficiency of Nash equilibrium in monotone decreasing games is called the tragedy of 
the commons, while the failure in monotone increasing games is called the free rider 
problem.   In the case of monotone increasing games, in Nash equilibrium, people 
                                                 
2 The set of strategy profiles where all players play the same strategy is called an 
isopraxis,  by J. Silvestre, in his contribution to this issue.  
3 Simple Kantian equilibria exist for a broader class of games than symmetric ones (see 
Roemer(in press, chapter 2). 
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contribute too little; in the case of monotone decreasing games, they fish too much.  But 
we have: 
 
Proposition 2.1   The simple Kantian equilibrium of a strictly monotone game (symmetric 
or not)  is Pareto efficient. 
 
 This result is what I referred to earlier when I said that in symmetric game, if 
everyone plays the strategy he’d like everyone to play, the result is ‘good.’    Because this 
result is so central to the idea of Kantian optimization,  I will prove it here. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: 
Let the game   be strictly monotone decreasing.  Let   be a  
simple Kantian equilibrium. If it is not Pareto efficient, then there is a vector 
  such that: 
 ,   (2.4) 
where the inequality is strict for at least one index i.   Let j be an index such that 
 .   Then  . This follows because we have reduced 
the efforts (E) of some players other than j and increased the efforts of no players, 
because   is minimal among the  .  So the strict inequality just stated follows 
from the fact that the game is strictly monotone decreasing.  But this last inequality 
implies that: 
  , (2.5) 
by the application of (2.4).   This contradicts the assumption that E* is a simple Kantian 
equilibrium, for agent j would prefer that everyone play , which proves the 
proposition.  
 An analogous proof establishes the claim for monotone increasing games.   
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 In this sense, simple Kantian equilibrium resolves the inefficiencies due to both 
negative and positive externalities that are characteristic of Nash equilibrium4. 
 The general version of a  symmetric prisoners’ dilemma is given by the 
payoff matrix in table 1: 
 
 
  C D 
C (0,0) (-c,1) 
D (1,-c) (-b,-b) 
  
Table 1.   The payoffs are (row player, column player). 
 
where      .     (2.6) 
 
Let’s look at the more complicated version of the PD where each player plays a mixed 
strategy: with probability p the row player plays C, and with probability q the column 
player plays C.   Then the payoff function of the row player is: 
  , (2.7) 
and by symmetry, the payoff function of the column player is: 
 
 .  (2.8) 
Calculate that : 
   
  for all p,  (2.9) 
so this is a strictly monotone increasing game.   Hence the simple Kantian equilibrium of 
the game is Pareto efficient, by Proposition 2.1.    This means there is no mixed-strategy 
pair that can give a higher expected utility to both players than the simple Kantian 
equilibrium.    The exact form of the simple Kantian equilibrium of the game depends 
upon the values of b and c.    The Nash equilibrium of the game is always  (0,0):  both 
players defect for sure, and the outcome is inefficient. 
                                                 
4 Indeed, one can prove that if the payoff functions are differentiable, any interior Nash 
equilibrium in a monotone game is Pareto inefficient (Roemer[in press, Proposition 3.3]). 
 11 
 Let me now make precise one of my criticisms of the behavioral economics.  One 
can compute that if  , then the simple Kantian equilibrium of the PD game is that 
both players cooperate with probability: 
  , (2.10) 
a probability strictly between zero and one.  In other words,  full cooperation (  ) is 
not the simple Kantian equilibrium!  Of course, it remains true that   is Pareto 
efficient: in particular, it is better for both players (in ex ante utility) than the strategy 
profile (1,1).  Now suppose you are a behavioral economist, and you want to insert an 
exotic argument into the preferences of the agents so that the Nash equilibrium of the 
game will be  ?  How would you do it?  Recall that the preferences you create 
must not work just for this PD game but for all PD games.   
There turns out to be a way, and I believe only one sensible way, of doing this. 
Assign each player a new payoff function, which is the sum of the payoff functions of the 
two players in the original PD.  That is, define: 
  
  . (2.11) 
 
Now consider the game where both players have the payoff function Q – of course, the 
row player continues to play p and the column player q.   It is not hard to check that the 
Nash equilibrium of this game is indeed: 
 
    .     (2.12) 
So we can rationalize the simple Kantian equilibrium of the PD game as the Nash 
equilibrium of a game where each player is maximizing an ‘exotic’ preference order,  the 
total payoff of the original game.  
 This might appear to support the behavioral economist’s strategy.   Here indeed – 
and this can be checked – the simple Kantian equilibrium of a symmetric game is always 
a Nash equilibrium of an altered game where each player’s payoff function is the sum of 
all players’ payoff functions in the original game.   There are, however, two problems 
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with this move:  first, is it credible to think that’s what players are doing when they play 
the cooperative strategy in such a game – that they are attempting to maximize the total 
payoff?   This is something that can be studied experimentally, and I conjecture it will not 
be borne out.   But secondly, this trick (of transforming a Kantian equilibrium into a Nash 
equilibrium of a game with altered preferences) only works when the game is symmetric.  
A bit more on this later. 
 
3.  Simple production economies 
 We now consider a class of simple production economies in which we can study 
Kantian optimization in environments with negative and positive externalities.  Suppose 
there is a production function that produces a desirable consumption good from the 
efforts of individuals, according to the production function  , where G is strictly 
concave, increasing and differentiable,   is the labor expended by person i, measured 
in efficiency units, and  .   Player i has a utility function  where x is 
the consumption good produced.   As usual u is concave, increasing in x , decreasing in 
E, and differentiable.    For the moment, we allow the preferences of individuals to differ.  
 
A.   The fishing economy 
 In the fishing economy, we think of G as production of fish from a lake, which 
suffers from congestion externalities, the more labor is expended in fishing: hence, the 
strict concavity of G.    Recall that an interior allocation is Pareto efficient exactly when : 
 
  , (3.1) 
for this is the statement that the marginal rate of substitution between labor and fish  for 
each fisher  equals the marginal rate of transformation of labor into fish (MRT).  
 The allocation rule in this economy is given by: 
  ; (3.2) 
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that is, except for random noise, each fisher receives fish in proportion to the efficiency 
units of labor he expends.   Another way of putting this is that ‘each fisher keeps her 
catch.’   
 We can define a game:  the payoff to fisher i, is given by the function: 
  . (3.3) 
It is well-known, that due to the strict concavity of G, the Nash equilibrium of this game 
is Pareto inefficient.  This is the classical example of the tragedy of the commons.  In 
Nash optimization, players do not take into account the negative externality they impose 
on other fishers by their own fishing.  For each additional hour I fish, I lower the 
marginal productivity of everyone’s labor on the lake.   Indeed, the Nash equilibrium is 
the solution of these equations: 
  . (3.4) 
In words, the marginal rate of substitution of a fisher is equal to a convex combination of 
the marginal rate of transformation and the average product.   Only in the case of one 
fisher is this allocation Pareto efficient – as long as G is not linear. 
 To apply the concept of simple Kantian equilibrium, we will assume for the 
moment that   for all i.     What is the simple Kantian equilibrium of the game? It is 
given by solving: 
 ,  (3.5) 
for the solution of (3.5) is the amount of fishing time that each player would like all to 
expend.    Taking the derivative, we have: 
   (3.6) 
But this is the condition for Pareto efficiency!   Hence the simple Kantian equilibrium is 
Pareto efficient. 
 Now, a caveat.  You might have observed that the game defined in (3.3) is a 
monotone decreasing game, and hence concluded from Prop. 2.1 that the simple Kantian 
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equilibrium (SKE) is Pareto efficient, and so the derivation (3.6) is redundant.  But that 
inference is false.  What Proposition 2.1 shows is that the SKE is Pareto efficient among 
all allocations that can be achieved in the game, so defined : that means among all 
allocations in which consumption of fish is proportional to labor expended.  But (3.6) is a 
much stronger statement: it says that the SKE is Pareto efficient in the set of all feasible 
allocations for this economy.   There is no way of allocating the total fish caught to the 
fishers, through any intricate system of redistribution, that can Pareto dominate the SKE 
of the game that models the fishing economy.    In other words, we achieve full efficiency 
even though we restrict ourselves to allocations where each fisher keeps her catch.  The 
demonstration in (3.6) is stronger than Proposition 2.1. 
 Again, I must make the comparison with the behavioral-economics approach.  
Because this is a symmetric game (when all utility functions are the same), it is indeed 
the case that the Nash equilibrium of the game where each player maximizes the sum of 
utilities of all players is the simple Kantian equilibrium given by (3.6).   So we have, at 
this point, two explanations if a fishing community achieves the Pareto efficient 
allocation in which each keeps his catch: either each is fishing the amount of time he 
would all everyone to fish, or each is a complete altruist, desiring to maximize total 
utility. 
 
B. Heterogeneous preferences  
 We now relax the assumption that all utility functions are the same, and assume 
the profile of utility functions is   .    One simple way to generate 
heterogeneous preferences is to say that everyone has the same preferences over fish and 
labor time, but since fishers have different skill levels, this induces heterogeneous 
preferences over fish and efficiency units of labor.   Recall that the relevant labor in our 
models is the latter. 
 It’s now the case that simple Kantian equilibria will generally not exist:  the labor 
that I would most like everyone to expend is the different from the labor you would most 
like everyone to expend.     There is, however, a generalization of Kantian optimization 
that we can use with heterogeneous preferences. 
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 Suppose at an allocation   I am contemplating increasing my 
fishing time by 5%.   I ask myself: How would I like it if everyone increased her fishing 
time by 5%?   The implicit moral commandment here is that I should only increase my 
fishing time by 5% if I’d be happy were everyone to do the same.    It’s a way of making 
me take into account the negative externality created by my contemplated action.  But I 
don’t ask myself how would my increased fishing would affect others, but rather how, if 
they emulated my action, their increased fishing times would affect me.     Don’t worry 
too much at this point about the psychological realism of this question.   Instead, let’s 
study the properties of an equilibrium when everyone thinks in this way. 
 
Definition 3.1   An allocation of efforts   is a multiplicative Kantian 
equilibrium  (a   equilibrium) if nobody would like to rescale everybody’s fishing time 
by any non-negative scale factor.     That is: 
 
      (3.7) 
I have stated the definition for the fishing economy, but in the attached footnote, I state it 
for a general game in normal form.5 
  We have the general result, using the definition in the footnote: 
Proposition 3.1  If   is a positive  equilibrium of a strictly monotone 
game  , then it is Pareto efficient in the game. 
 The proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of proposition 2.1. 
 In particular, the fishing game of (3.7) is a strictly monotone decreasing game.  
So Proposition 3.1 implies that the multiplicative Kantian equilibrium, if it exists, is 
Pareto efficient in the game.    As before, we must recall that being efficient ‘in the game’ 
                                                 
5 Let the payoff functions of the game be  where the strategy space for each player 
is an interval of real numbers.   Then   is a   equilibrium of the game when 
 .  
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means in the class of allocations where each keeps his catch.   But we could ask for a 
stronger result:  is the  equilibrium efficient in the economy? 
 We have: 
 
Proposition 3.2 Any strictly positive   equilibrium of the fishing game is Pareto 
efficient in the economy. 
 
 Again, because this is a key result, let’s prove it. 
Proof: 
1.  By concavity of the utility functions and G, it is only necessary to show that : 
   
This suffices, because the antecedent to the implication sign is the first-order 
characterization of   equilibrium. 
2.   Compute that: 
  . (3.8) 
Using the assumption that  , this equation reduces to: 
  
  , (3.9) 
which is exactly the condition for Pareto efficiency at an interior solution.   
 
 As with the case of homogeneous preferences, we can therefore assert a stronger 
statement than Proposition 3.1: in the fishing economy, multiplicative Kantian 
optimization resolves the tragedy of the commons that afflicts Nash equilibrium.  (Recall 
the Nash equilibrium of the fishing game is given by (3.4).)  
 Do such equilibria exist?   These are allocations in which fish consumed is 
proportional to labor expended and the allocation is Pareto efficient.   The idea of looking 
for such allocations is due to Joaquim Silvestre.    In Roemer and Silvestre (1993),  we 
proved that in economies much more general than the simple production economies 
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studied here, such allocations always exist.   Silvestre’s question was asked in the context 
of thinking about the socialist ideal: an allocation in which the total product is distributed 
in proportion to labor expended, and is Pareto efficient.    Remarkably, perhaps, this 
question had not been raised earlier by mathematical socialist economists like Oscar 
Lange and Michio Morishima.    It was not, however, until several years later that I 
observed that these allocations, which Silvestre and I called proportional solutions, had 
the property of being stable with respect to the kind of optimization that I now call 
Kantian  (see Roemer [1996, Theorem 6.6]).   Also, as an illustration of the 
circuitousness of my thinking, the much simpler idea of simple Kantian equilibrium in 
symmetric games did not occur to me for another twenty years.     
 
 We can now repeat our earlier question: Is there a way of altering preferences in 
the fishing game so that the Nash equilibrium of the altered game is the Pareto efficient 
allocation in which each keeps his catch (i.e., the multiplicative Kantian equilibrium)?   
(There is often a unique such allocation; in any case, there is a finite number of such 
allocations.)   The answer is there is no simple way of doing this: the idea of giving all 
players the desire to maximize total utility no longer works.    For further discussion of 
the representation of Kantian equilibria as Nash equilibria of games with exotic 
preferencers, I refer the reader to Roemer (in press, chapter 6).  
 In other words, in games that are fairly complicated, the behavioral economist’s 
strategy of altering preferences in order to achieve the good (cooperative) solution as the 
Nash equilibrium of a game does not work.   Essentially, one has to know what the good 
solution is a priori and then one can jimmy preferences to give the right answer under 
Nash optimization.   But this procedure cannot be regarded as decentralizing cooperation.   
In contrast, multiplicative Kantian optimization decentralizes cooperation, in the exact 
sense that Nash optimization decentralizes competition.  As with Nash, there is no 
obvious solution to the dynamic problem of how one converges to a Nash (or Kantian) 
equilibrium.  But, as with Nash, both kinds of equilibria are stable given the kind of 
optimization that players are using, once equilibrium is achieved. 
 I will have more to say about the realism of proposing that players in a game 
might optimize in the multiplicative Kantian fashion –  but later.   At this point, however,  
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I still want to explicate the properties of this kind of thinking. 
 
C. The hunting economy 
 Consider the game that according to anthropologists characterized early hunting 
societies.  Unlike fishers, hunters divided the catch equally (more or less).   A group of 
hunters goes out into the bush for a few days.   They return with their catch, and divide it 
equally among the group.  
 Here the allocation rule is: 
    ,    (3.10) 
which is the equal-division rule.  The game defined by the equal-division rule is given 
by: 
  
  . (3.11) 
This is a game with positive externalities:  the total catch is a public good.  The game is 
strictly monotone increasing.    Again, the Nash equilibrium, which is given by the next 
set of equations, is Pareto inefficient as long as there is more than one hunter: 
  . (3.12) 
 Why is the Nash equilibrium inefficient?  Because a hunter might like to take a 
nap for several hours under a bush, given what others are doing.   He contributes less to 
the public good than efficiency requires.  There is a free rider problem. 
 It turns out that multiplicative Kantian optimization does not resolve this 
inefficiency.    But there is a kind of Kantian optimization that does.   Suppose the hunter 
asks himself, “I’d like to take a two hour nap.  But how would I feel if everyone took at 
two hour nap?”   If the moral commandment is to take the nap only if the answer to this 
question is affirmative, then an equilibrium is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 3.2  An allocation   is an additive Kantian equilibrium   if 
and only if: 
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   (3.13) 
In other words,  nobody would like to translate the effort vector by any number (positive 
or negative)6. 
 
I will now leave it to the reader to verify: 
 
Proposition  3.3  Any additive Kantian equilibrium of the hunting game is Pareto efficient 
in the economy.  
 Thus, additive Kantian optimization resolves the under-provision of the public 
good in the hunting economy. 
 Kantian optimization always takes the form of each asking:  “If we all take a 
similar symmetric action, what would I like that action to be?”  In the case when the 
game is symmetric, the action is ‘making the same contribution.’  In the fishing game, the 
action is ‘rescaling the current allocation by a common factor;’ in the hunting game, it is 
‘translating the current allocation by a common factor.’    
 
D.   More general allocation rules in simple production economies 
 
 Let’s define an allocation rule for an economic environment specified by the data 
 as the share of output   each individual receives as a function of the 
vector of effort contributions.  We have studied two rules, the proportional and equal-
division rules, whose share rules are: 
   
  . (3.14) 
                                                 
6 For general games,    is an additive Kantian equilibrium if: 
 . 
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Indeed, these are surely the two classical notions of fair division of a jointly produced 
output.  We have shown that each of these rules can be efficiently implemented --  more 
strongly, efficiently decentralized—by a specific kind of Kantian optimization. 
 We can also think more generally about kinds of Kantian symmetrical treatment.  
Define a Kantian variation as a function  where E is a contribution and r is a 
number where the following holds: 
  
  . (3.15) 
The multiplicative Kantian variation is given by: 
   (3.16) 
and the additive Kantian variation  is given by: 
  
  . (3.17) 
 
Now we say that the allocation rule   is efficiently implemented by the Kantian variation 
 on the set of economies  if for all economies: 
 
  , (3.18) 
where  . 
  
 Equations (3.18) simply state the generalization of multiplicative and additive 
Kantian equilibrium to other allocation rules, and other types of Kantian variation.  They 
say that an allocation has the property that, for the given allocation rule , nobody would 
like to vary the entire effort vector according to any transformation permitted by the 
variation defined by .    
 
Definition 3.2    The pair   is an efficient Kantian pair if the allocation rule   is 
efficiently implemented as a   equilibrium on all economies of the form  . 
 What we have thus far shown is that   and   are efficient Kantian 
pairs.   The question is: Are there any others? 
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 The answer is that there is a unidimensional continuum of such pairs, of which the 
two we have studied are the endpoints.    Consider allocation rule of the form: 
   (3.19) 
 where  .    Notice that   is the proportional rule, and that as   
approaches infinity,    approaches the equal-division rule.  Because of this, let’s define 
 .   We have: 
 
Proposition 3.4   For every rule  , there is a Kantian variation that implements it 
efficiently on the domain of production economies we are considering.  Furthermore, 
there are no other allocation rules that can be efficiently implemented on this domain 
with respect to any Kantian variation7. 
(For proof, see Roemer (in press, Corollary 4.4).) 
 
 What do the rules   look like?  It is easy to show that they are ‘convex 
combinations’ of the proportional rule and equal division rule.   Let’s solve the following 
equation for  : 
    
 .  (3.20) 
The solution is   .    The important fact is that the value of   is independent 
of i.  This means that the rule  is simply this: it takes a share   of the output   
and distributes it to the participants in proportion to the efficiency units of labor 
expended, and it distributes the rest of the output equally to all.   The share  , however, 
                                                 
7 There are two caveats.   If  , the allocation rules can also be efficiently 
implemented; however,  Kantian allocations may not exist.  And for   we must 
insist that the allocation be strictly positive.  (The zero vector is a multiplicative Kantian 
equilibrium but it is not Pareto efficient.) 
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depends upon the equilibrium.   We know that as   travels from zero to infinity, the 
share   travels from one to zero: but that is all that we can say.  
 It’s for this reason that I put ‘convex combination’ in quotations marks earlier.  
We cannot specify the share   to be – say – one-half, and then quickly choose the right 
allocation rule to implement that share.    To say this mathematically, the mapping from 
  is complicated, as to know it we have to compute the equilibrium to know  .  
Only after knowing the equilibrium for each  can we find the one that implements a 
particular combination of proportional and equal division.  
 The upshot of this discussion is that the class of allocation rules that can be 
efficiently implemented by any kind of Kantian thinking is precisely the class of rules 
generated by the two classical egalitarian methods of distribution: in proportion to effort 
and equally.  As these rules have a venerable history as rules of fair allocation, 
Proposition 3.4 re-enforces the view that Kantian optimization is the right way of 
thinking about morality and, may we say, cooperation. 
 I conclude this section with a remark about the behavioral feasibility of Kantian 
optimization.   I think simple Kantian optimization is natural – there are many symmetric 
games that describe our social interactions, and in those games, I think many people ask 
the Kantian question: what’s the action I’d like everyone to take?   Multiplicative and 
additive Kantian optimization are, however, not natural.  I think symmetry plays a large 
role in our conceptions of fairness, and the symmetrical treatment of all characteristic of 
Kantian optimization recommends it as a way of implementing fairness.  But I do not 
claim societies have discovered these complex ways of optimizing.  Rather, I see the 
approach as prescriptive.   If the fairness involved in these kinds of Kantian optimization 
appeals to people, we may recommend –- to a fishing community, for example – the 
multiplicative Kantian equilibrium as a solution to their problem.  Doing so, of course, 
would require the planner to know the preferences of the fishers, unless some process I 
do not yet understand could lead dynamically to the Kantian equilibrium of the game.  
 I have given examples where Kantian optimization resolves a tragedy of the 
commons, and a free rider problem.   In fact, we have two general results:  first, ‘any’ 
kind of Kantian optimization results in Pareto efficient equilibria in all strictly monotone 
games, and second, generically, the Nash equilibria in strictly monotone games are Pareto 
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inefficient.  (See Roemer (in press, chapter 2.)  Of course, the value of these statements 
depends upon the existence of the equilibria in question.   
  Thus, cooperation in the sense of Kantian reasoning resolves, generally, the two 
major failures of Nash optimization. 
 
4.   Market socialism 
 Thus far, I have described economies that do not trade on markets.  Indeed, there 
is nothing that can be thought of as comprising trade in the fishing and hunting 
economies.   We now ask what role Kantian optimization can play in market economies. 
 Indeed, I will propose that Kantian optimization can play an important role in a 
design for market socialism.   The ‘design problem’ for socialism is stated by the 
philosopher G.A. Cohen as follows: 
 
In my view, the principal problem that faces the socialist ideal is that we do not 
know how to design the machinery that would make it run. Our problem is not, 
primarily, human selfishness, but our lack of a suitable organizational technology: our 
problem is a problem of design. It may be an insoluble design problem, and it is a 
design problem that is undoubtedly exacerbated by our selfish propensities, but a 
design problem, so I think, is what we’ve got.     (Cohen, 2009) 
 
What Cohen means is this.   Capitalism has a design consisting of private property rights 
in labor and productive assets, and free trade, mediated by prices that equilibrate supply 
and demand.  The ethos that makes capitalism work is the maximization of self-regarding 
preferences in an autarchic manner:  the individualist ethos is captured not only in the 
nature of preferences, but in the manner in which people optimize ( à la Nash).  Cohen 
also views the motivation for economic activity under capitalism as being ‘greed and 
fear,’ a point with which I do not completely agree. 
  Socialism, however, is supposed to be an economic system characterized by 
cooperation.    The natural question becomes, how can one design an economic system 
based on cooperation to deliver good results?   The first theorem of welfare economics 
for capitalist economies is the main formalized example of capitalism’s good result.  Can 
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we design a mechanism, that given a socialist ethos, would deliver good results?    A 
good result for socialism should demand a higher standard than for capitalism:  we desire 
to have not only efficiency but also a substantial degree of income equality. 
  Cohen, in the above quotation, says that it is not primarily (selfish) human 
nature that poses a problem for socialism, it is the lack of a solution to this design 
problem.   Cohen, evidently, is optimistic about human nature – and there is indeed good 
reason to be so.  Many people, in today’s capitalist societies, do not plan their lives to 
maximize their wealth, but to do work that is useful for society.  I agree with Cohen that 
human nature is not the primary obstacle to socialism, but the lack of a design that can 
decentralize economic activity to achieve good results, given that a socialist ethos exists 
in the population.    
 To state the problem slightly differently, recall the huge effect that Marx’s theory 
of historical materialism had on engendering an international socialist movement.  Marx 
offered – if not a design in the sense here being discussed – a vision of the feasibility and 
indeed historical necessity of socialism.   We need not here debate the validity of that 
vision: what’s salient is that, possessing this vision, millions of people organized to 
attempt to realize it.     Now that vision has soured, due to the experiences of twentieth 
century socialism, polluted and hindered as they were by political authoritarianism and 
the fear of introducing markets.    Having a design for how socialism could work, given a 
willing population, is of primary importance in rekindling the socialist vision. 
 I am less suspicious of markets than Cohen was, and so I will propose how 
incorporating cooperative optimization into a market economy can produce eqiuilibria 
which are decentralized, efficient, and equitable. 
 The model is considerably more general than the one I now exposit, for purposes 
of clarity.   Assume there is one produced good, which is used both for investment and 
consumption.   The good is produced from capital and labor, according to a production 
function , which is operated by a firm.    The firm is owned by private citizens 
and the state.   The share in the firm’s profits of private citizen i is  , for   
and the state’s share is  : so  .   Individuals, as well as owning shares of the 
firm, have endowments of efficiency units of labor in the amount  .   Citizen i has a 
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preference order over consumption of the good and labor expended, denoted in efficiency 
units, represented by a utility function  .   The state is endowed with an amount 
of capital  -- this endowment was presumably produced in the previous period, not 
formalized in the model.    Individuals own no capital, nor do they hold inventories of the 
consumption good.  (The capital good and consumption good are, as I said, the same 
good, except for their vintage.) 
 So far, I have described exactly the set-up of an Arrow-Debreu economy, except 
for the state’s partial ownership of the firm.  There will be three prices in this economy, a 
price for output p,  an interest rate for borrowing capital r, and a wage w per unit of 
efficiency labor.  (Because the capital with which the state is endowed was produced in 
the past,  its rental price will differ from the price of the good produced in the present 
period.)   The firm behaves exactly as an Arrow-Debreu firm:  it demands capital and 
labor and supplies the good in order to maximize profits.  All incomes in the economy, 
except the state’s revenues, will be taxed at an exogenous rate   , and the 
revenues will returned to the citizenry as a demogrant: that is, divided equally among 
them.   This is a flat, or affine, income tax.   
 How does the state behave?  It supplies capital to the firm to maximize its 
income, which it uses to purchase the good produced by firm, to be used for next period’s 
investment.    In fact, the model is truncated: there is only one period, for purposes of 
simplicity.   So the firm demands capital in the present period, which is uniquely supplied 
by the state, and supplies the state with the good produced at present, which the state 
purchases with its revenues (rents and capital income).  
 How do consumer-workers behave?   Given a worker’s labor supply   to the 
firm, he uses his revenues to purchase the good for consumption.   Workers’ revenues 
come from three sources:  their after-tax wage and profit income, and the demogrant.   
 The only substantial way in which the model differs from the standard Arrow-
Debreu model, besides the state’s role,  is in the determination of the labor supplies of 
workers.  The vector of labor supplies   must be an additive Kantian 
equilibrium of a game to be defined below. 
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 Finally, a price vector   comprises a Walras-Kant equilibrium at the tax 
rate t if, given the optimizing  behaviors described, all markets clear: that is, the supply 
of the good by the firm equals the demand of consumers for the good plus the demand by 
the state for the good (investment),  the supply of capital by the state equals the firm’s 
demand for capital, and the total efficiency units of labor supplied by workers equals the 
demand for labor by the firm.  
 We state the definition formally. 
 
Definition 4.1   A Walras-Kant market-socialist equilibrium at tax rate t, consists of:    
i. a price vector  , 
ii. labor and capital demands by the firm of D and K , respectively, 
iii. labor supplies   by all workers  to the firm, 
iv. for all private agents i, commodity demands   for the good, and a demand for 
the good by the state of ,   
such that: 
v. at given prices,   maximizes profits of the firm; 
vi. the labor supply vector  constitutes an additive Kantian 
equilibrium at the given prices of the game   defined in equation (4.4) below; 
vii.    maximizes the utility of agent i, given prices, her labor supply, and her 
income  (that is, its purchase exhausts her budget);  
viii.   maximizes the state’s utility  subject to its budget constraint  
  , and  
ix. all markets clear; that is,   ,  , and  . 
 We must now be more precise in order to define the game of which the effort 
vector must be an additive Kantian equilibrium.  First, define the income of the state, 
which will be: 
  , (4.1) 
where the firm’s profits are: 
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  . (4.2) 
In words,  (4.1) states that the state’s income consists of its share of firm profits plus the 
interest on its investment.   The income of worker i is given by: 
 .  (4.3) 
The first term on the right-hand side of (4.3) is agent i’s after-tax wage income, the 
second term is her after-tax profit income, and the third term is the demogrant, which is 
the agent’s per capita share of tax revenues, where taxes are levied on all incomes except 
the state’s. 
 
 The payoff function for worker i is given by :     
 
  . (4.4)  
That is, the worker’s utility is generated by spending her entire income on the 
consumption good, and her labor.  This completes the definition of equilibrium. 
 
 If we assume that the depreciation rate of capital is zero, then the state’s capital, 
to be used in the ‘next period,’ will be .   
 I emphasize that the only substantial ways in which this equilibrium differs from a 
private-ownership Arrow-Debreu equilibrium are that the state carries out all the 
investment, and the labor-supply decisions do not comprise a Nash equilibrium for 
workers, but an additive Kantian equilibrium.  In determining their supplies of labor, 
workers do not ask whether supplying an extra day’s labor generates an after-tax wage 
that compensates for the extra disutility of labor, assuming all other workers’ supplies of 
labor remain fixed, but rather, whether the extra day’s income compensates for the extra 
day’s work, assuming all others expend an extra day’s labor as well, which would 
increase substantially the value of the demogrant. 
 The consequence of this single change in optimizing behavior is the following: 
 
 28 
Proposition 4.1  Let   be a Walras-Kant equilibrium at any 
tax rate  .   The equilibrium is Pareto efficient. 
 
 One might call this proposition the ‘first welfare theorem of market socialism.’   It 
states that the equilibrium is Pareto efficient at any income tax rate.  In particular, 
society, by democratic choice of the tax rate, can achieve any degree of income equality 
it desires – even perfect income equality, when   -- with no sacrifice in efficiency.    
 To be precise, I must explain what Pareto efficiency means here.    Think of the 
state’s having the utility function  ;  the state simply cares about the amount of 
the investment good it acquires for the ‘next period,’  placed in quotes because the formal 
model has only one period.    An allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible 
allocation that renders some agent better off, and none worse off, where the state is 
included as an agent.     Now since there is no future in this model, we cannot assert that 
the state’s investment is that which trades off efficiently present and future consumption 
of workers.     Most economists believe that the Soviet Union and China invested too high 
a fraction of the national product – these states were (probably) not trading off future 
against present consumption of their citizens properly.  That, too, can happen in the 
present model.   But to deal with this problem, one would have to articulate a multi-
period model, and I have elected here to keep things simple by truncating the future. 
 What is the trick that generates what appears to be an astounding result – that 
there is no trade-off between efficiency and equality in the model?    The usual dead-
weight loss of income taxation has been, apparently, entirely nullified by Kantian 
optimization in the labor supply decision.   Without giving a full proof of Proposition 3.1, 
I can indicate how this occurs. 
 Let’s ask how a worker sees his income as varying if he and all other workers 
increase their labor supply by a small amount.   We must calculate: 
 
   (4.5) 
expanding this derivative shows it is equal to: 
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    (4.6) 
where   are the derivatives of G and   with respect to their second 
component.    Now at equilibrium,  we have: 
  ; (4.7) 
both statements are directly the consequence of the firm’s having maximized profits.  
Therefore  the mathematical expression in (4.6) reduces to: 
    . (4.8) 
That is, in contemplating the counterfactual stipulated in the definition of additive 
Kantian optimization, the worker computes that an extra’s days work will supply her not 
with the after wage , but with the gross wage, w.   This is because what the 
worker loses in her personal tax bite, she regains in the increased value of the demogrant.  
So the appropriate optimization condition is that the worker equate her gross wage to the 
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption.    But this is the condition 
for Pareto efficiency! 
 In contrast, the worker who Nash-optimizes assumes that if she increases her 
labor supply by a small amount, all other workers stand pat, and this means the worker’s 
optimality condition is equality of the after –tax wage  and the marginal rate of 
substitution between labor and consumption.  Thus is generated the dead-weight loss of 
taxation in the standard Arrow-Debreu model. 
 Do these equilibria exist?   Under standard conditions, they do: 
 
Proposition 4.2  If the production function G is concave and satisfies standard conditions, 
and each utility function is strictly concave and the demand for the commodity is normal, 
then a Walras-Kant equilibrium exists for all tax rates .8 
  
                                                 
8  The ‘standard conditions’ on G are the Inada conditions and homotheticity; a 
consumption good is normal if an increase in income generates an increase in the good’s 
consumption.   These conditions are sufficient for equilibrium; they may not be 
necessary. 
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 Furthermore, the propositions remain true with many firms and many goods. 
What happens if private citizens can also invest in the firm(s)?   To preserve the first 
welfare theorem, we would have to require that the vector of investments also be an 
additive Kantian equilibrium.  This strikes me as being a less plausible assumption than 
the labor-supply assumption9.   
5. Discussion 
 
 The first model of market socialism is credited to Oscar Lange and Fred Taylor 
(1938).    I have reviewed their model elsewhere (Roemer [1994]), and the discussion it 
generated --  importantly, the critiques made by Friedrich Hayek (1940).   I shall not do 
so again here, except to say that the model’s principal feature was state control of 
investment.   Lange and Taylor also proposed a kind of tâtonnement process, in which the 
central planning board imitated convergence of prices to what they imagined markets did 
in reality.   That part of their model has been discredited by later work of general-
equilibrium theorists, who have shown that the tâtonnement process does not in general 
converge to the equilibrium, even when one exists.10    There have been several market-
socialist models where the state or other public institutions carry out investment; the most 
recent contribution is by Giacomo Corneo (2017).   The focus of these models has been 
upon equalizing the distribution of capital income in society: the state spends its profit 
income either on investment or public goods and services or demogrants.  But these 
models have had relatively little to say about labor income, which in advanced economies 
comprises at least 60% of national income.     Informally, we can imagine that the state 
would invest substantially more in compensating children from disadvantaged 
households to build up their skills, and it may also engage in redistributive taxation.  
However, these facets have not been formalized by market-socialist theorists in novel 
ways. 
 One must also mention the theory of labor management, in which workers own 
firms, and maximize valued added per worker.   The most rigorous presentation is due to 
                                                 
9 The results exposited in this section, in a somewhat more complicated model, are given 
in Roemer (in press). 
10 See Sonnenschein (1972), Debreu (1974), Mantel (1974). 
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Jacques Drèze (1989), who shows that the equilibria in a labor-managed economy are 
isomorphic to Arrow-Debreu equilibria (without taxation), and are hence Pareto efficient.  
 The novelty of the present approach is that it embeds a formal model of worker 
cooperation into a market economy, something that has not been done earlier, probably  
because no simple model of cooperation existed.  Of course, forming a worker-owned 
firm, or having the state manage investment, can be thought of as a form of social 
cooperation, and so my latest statement may seem too narrow.   What I intend to say is 
that cooperative behavior in decision making has not been formally injected into market 
socialist models heretofore, and it should be, if we take seriously the idea that socialist 
ethos is something quite different from capitalist ethos, and deserves a formalization.   To 
repeat my earlier point in this context, the socialist ethos in the model of market socialism 
presented here is not altruistic, but cooperative. 
 Finally, I wish to address the question that most readers will undoubtedly have 
about the proposed market-socialist model – and indeed, about the rather complicated 
forms of behavior stipulated in multiplicative and additive Kantian optimization more 
generally.   It might be useful to say that Nash optimization was probably viewed with 
some trepidation as a characterization of human behavior when Nash introduced it as a 
graduate student in mathematics in 1950.  Von Neumann apparently rejected it out of 
hand when Nash explained it to him.  We still lack an adequate theory of how players 
converge to a Nash equilibrium; often, a sequence of iterated best responses does 
converge to an equilibrium, but the weakness of this mathematical fact as an explanation 
of convergence is that at each step in the process, the assumption that players make that 
other players’ actions are fixed is belied11.    Yet we do seem to have ample evidence that 
many stable situations appear to be describable as Nash equilibria of social interactions 
that can be described as games.    And as I’ve said, even behavioral economists, who 
challenge the most classical interpretation of these equilibria do not depart from 
describing them as Nash equilibria of games, albeit with exotic preferences. 
 I think three pre-requisites are necessary for believing that a society of workers 
could actually optimize their labor-supply decisions in the manner postulated by additive 
                                                 
11 In like manner, a sequence of iterated best responses also often converges to a Kantian 
equilibrium.  See Roemer (in press, chapter 7). 
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Kantian optimization: desire, understanding and trust.   Workers must desire to 
cooperate, they must see themselves as part of a solidaristic venture, in which 
cooperation could further their interests.   They must understand that if they act in 
concert as the Kantian optimization process stipulates, the results will be good, in the 
sense that the issue of efficiency can be separated from that of income distribution.  
Citizens can decide on how much redistribution they believe is warranted, due to the 
unfairness of the distribution of endowments that will necessarily exist, without having to 
compromise because too much redistribution might be inefficient.   Thirdly, each must 
trust that if he optimizes in the Kantian manner so will most others: he will not be taken 
advantage of by Nash players.   
 We have many examples of Kantian behavior in history, and desire, 
understanding and trust surely characterized those occasions.   Although the labor-supply 
decision may seem more complex in the additive-Kantian protocol, in fact it is not 
cognitively more difficult than Nash optimization.  Each person need only know his own 
preferences, as in Nash optimization; and instead of standing pat when his marginal rate 
of substitution is equal to the net wage, he stands pat when it is equal to the gross wage.  
Perhaps more realistically, if workers are represented by unions in a national 
confederation, the union representatives can implement the additive Kantian equilibrium. 
Granted, education will be required.   At present, in the United States, many 
people do not seem to understand that their taxes are used for any useful purpose, let 
alone returned to them in transfer payments, services and public goods.   Europeans, 
being less state-phobic, may be more receptive to understanding the virtues of Kantian 
optimization.    This survey, however, has not attempted to address how we get there 
from here:  rather, its more modest aim has been to offer a design that can motivate our 





Figure 1  The curve is the distribution function of thresholds q.  The stable equilibrium is 
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